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Given that Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders have both written extensively on the history 
of British politics and political thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Thatcherism 
was bound to crop up on their research agenda. As official papers are continually released 
according to the thirty year rule, so historians are able to broaden their focus on the eleven 
years during which Mrs Thatcher was Prime Minister and their book, Making Thatcher’s 
Britain, has enabled them to bring together thirteen case studies written by a variety of 
researchers – including themselves -, professors, lecturers and PhD students, which in itself 
shows that “Thatcherism” continues to interest a wide spectrum of scholars. Jackson and 
Saunders fully acknowledge the fact that a very impressive body of literature has already been 
devoted to Margaret Thatcher but their claim to novelty lies in the fact that they have adopted 
a historian’s standpoint in order to connect the varieties of Thatcherism not only to an 
ideology and political creed but to the overall history of twentieth century Britain. 
The book is divided into three parts which focus in turn on the different periods during 
which Thatcherism emerged as a political creed, secondly the way in which it has transformed 
and moulded Britain across different classes, regions and identities and thirdly, its impact on 
Britain’s place within the wider world is studied. There are two appendices, one of which is 
devoted to a detailed timeline from Mrs Thatcher’s birth in 1925 to her visit to Gordon Brown 
in Downing Street in 2007. The second appendix contains statistical information about 
elections in Great Britain, the economy, trade unions and government spending. 
The introduction contains a useful biography of Margaret Thatcher explaining her rise to 
power, her three terms as Prime Minister and her demise in 1990. Readers are also reminded 
of the main political events that stand out during this period (the Falklands’ crisis, the miners’ 
strike, the Poll Tax...) and enabled Thatcher to highly personalise her contribution to British 
politics. Indeed, the editors refer readily to the “Thatcher effect” in order to enhance the 
historical perspective they seek to give to their interrogation of the wider impact of 
Thatcherism. This said, Thatcherism as an ideology, as a deliberate attempt to modify the very 
foundations of British politics is a line of analysis that cannot be forsaken. Yet, as the period 
during which Thatcher was Prime Minister of Great Britain draws away in time, it is 
becoming easier to assess the impact her personal legacy and particular brand of politics has 
had on Britain. The editors point out the pragmatic changes in society that were ushered in 
during the Thatcher decade but remain wary about the fundamental upheaval in British culture 
that Thatcherism is supposed to have brought about. They suggest that in many instances, 
Britain has been simply swept along by the “wind of change” blowing in from other parts of 
the world, and that Margaret Thatcher was more the local architect of these changes than the 
instigator of any major revolution in British politics. To this end, and once again in an attempt 
to bolster their historical perspective, Jackson and Saunders attempt to identify the space 
occupied by Thatcherism within the Conservative political tradition. The Conservatives’ love 
of high politics has indeed constantly incited them to insulate the power which they crave 
from the grubby fray of day to day governing. And it is precisely the fine line drawn between 
the pressures of office, the force of ideology, adapting to crises and societal changes already 
in motion that historians are now grappling with in order to unravel the confusion and the 
ambiguities that surround Thatcherism. It is their task to assess why Thatcherism emerged in 
the first place, to what extent it veered away from the post-war consensus and the traditional 
Conservative line, if it really did modify the outlook of the British on their society and 
whether or not promises made in 1979 were actually kept. 
The first contribution deals essentially with the evolution of the narrative that gave the 
theoretical backbone to Thatcherism both within and without a Conservative Party that she 
had inherited in the throes of a crisis of confidence. Robert Saunders deals with the necessary 
distinction between ideas and ideology insisting that despite common belief fuelled essentially 
by Thatcher’s own pragmatic approach to such issues, Thatcherism is a subtle blend of the 
two that was defined both as a constructive project and as a warning against the opposing 
political forces at bay. While the former was portrayed as being a series of answers to 
particularly antagonistic situations, the latter blended perfectly with Thatcher’s personal brand 
of eschatological politics all the more so when it came to her main enemy: socialism. 
Thatcher’s anti-socialism was not only a political crusade but also – and mainly – a moral 
one. To prove this point, Saunders maps out both the moral and political failings of the 
Labour Party during the seventies and the threat it posed to “free” society that ushered in 
Thatcherism. He dwells particularly on the period after 1976 when Thatcher was obliged to 
tack between instinct and political necessity in order to obtain power at the next election 
especially in the relationship between the Conservatives and the trade unions. To this end, the 
“Winter of Discontent” occurred appropriately to underline both Labour’s failure to govern 
properly and the need for a new political settlement, opening up a breach that Thatcher was 
only too glad to use to her full advantage. Saunders concludes by stating that if at the outset 
Thatcherism was an oppositional creed, the post 1979 task necessarily involved transforming 
this into a positive programme for government. This is precisely where the narrative of 
Thatcherism played a vital role, tying up the strands of 1970s’ opposition into credible 
policies for the 1980s in the hope that a radical culture change in Britain would be achieved. 
Yet when after a decade a majority of Thatcher’s enemies had been slain, the resonance of 
Thatcherism itself had been altered leaving her successors to grapple not only with their own 
political identities but also with the task of redefining the legacy of their mentor. 
The following article written by the co-editor, Ben Jackson, explores the complex 
relationship between neo-liberalism and Thatcherism by putting the dissemination of this 
doctrine into a wider historical perspective, in accordance with the book’s claim to originality. 
Jackson bases his analysis on two assumptions namely that neo-liberalism is primarily 
disseminated via elites and that a great deal of archival evidence still remains insufficiently 
exploited. The author’s initial angle relates to the mobilisation of resources in putting the neo-
liberal case and he gives a detailed account of how one of the main think tanks, the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (IEA), emerged to broadcast the neo-liberal message supplied by its 
extensive network of international intellectuals. Jackson identifies the use British neo-liberals 
made of this input in defining the specificities of neo-liberalism in and for Britain and points 
out just how the IEA targeted its highly receptive elite audiences in order to imbue them with 
the neo-liberal message that in the seventies was also beginning to enjoy a broader penetration 
of the British press and broadcast journalism. Jackson’s last point deals with politicians 
themselves especially given that the IEA continually claimed to be non-partisan. This said, its 
agenda framed far more easily within the Conservative Party’s outlook and links with the 
Right seemed far more natural. Nevertheless, Jackson is quick to point out that before taking 
office and despite surrounding herself with neo-liberal advisors, Mrs Thatcher’s own links 
with the think tanks have yet to be confirmed. Her devotion to the free market, her desire to 
woo the middle classes by not being over zealous in dismantling the welfare state and her lack 
of interest in marketing her ideas perhaps explain this. 
The third contribution in this book deals with inflation and Thatcherite thinking, focussing 
on the period 1975-79. Jim Tomlinson begins by retracing some of the major characteristics 
of inflation during the twentieth century and then dwells particularly on how the Conservative 
abhorrence of inflation fed through into Mrs Thatcher’s political strategy vis-à-vis 
unemployment, the unions, and her desire to protect the middle classes. Indeed, for Thatcher, 
inflation was the Giant that had to be slain to put Britain back onto the road of recovery for it 
was synonymous with decline. To this end, the Conservatives identified four issues, namely 
the effects of organised labour on boosting wages claims and thus inflation, unemployment, 
public spending and borrowing and finally housing. In each case, the situation was examined 
through the monetarist prism and justification found for the Conservatives to rely on market 
forces to rebalance. Thus according to them, incomes’ policies artificially reinforced union 
power and once again artificially drove up wages while unemployment could not be solved by 
government but by reform of the labour market. This latter involved trade union collaboration 
and conveniently transferred some of the responsibility for high unemployment onto their 
shoulders. The dilemma concerning public spending and borrowing was particular in that 
although it could be neatly dealt with by the Conservatives’ desire to roll back the frontiers of 
the state, some of the main monetarist thinkers disagreed, favouring direct control of 
monetary growth over what they considered to be piecemeal and inappropriate intrusions into 
the money market. Housing was particular in that a property-owning democracy was central 
to Thatcher’s vision of British society especially if the overall decline were to be addressed. 
Yet this vision was incompatible with the much broader commitment to economic liberalism 
that Thatcherism came to symbolise. Indeed, as Tomlinson points out in his conclusion 
devoted to an assessment of the anti-inflation measures taken during the first years of 
government, housing is the perfect example of how Thatcher was unprepared to accept the 
means to the desired end. Otherwise, the failings of monetary policy to curb inflation after 
1979 are put down to a neglect of the international context in which the British economy was 
evolving, the impact of exchange rates being a case in point. Despite this weakness, the 
Conservatives were able to weather the unemployment storm at the beginning of the eighties 
not only thanks to contingent factors but mainly because their overall credibility concerning 
the economy, bolstered by a hard-line attitude towards the unions, was sounder than the 
Opposition’s. The rise of monetarism can be linked to the rise of inflation during the seventies 
but the success story of monetarism as an economic policy ends there. What it did enable the 
Conservatives to achieve was a vision of society with less state, a de-legitimisation of the 
trade unions and the promotion of the declinist case which made it all the more easy to portray 
socialism as the greatest evil of them all. 
In the following article, Matthew Grimley points out that there is a common tendency to 
view Thatcherism as primarily an economic phenomenon and to overlook its moral and 
religious dimensions. In the first part of his chapter, he deals with Thatcherism as a reaction to 
the permissive society and pinpoints Thatcher’s – as a woman, mother and politician - 
viewpoints on some of the outstanding legislation that characterised this period and the moral 
anarchy that she sought to redress. For many, the government’s role had gradually been 
reduced to that of regulating the economy and in doing so, moral issues had somewhat fallen 
by the wayside. Yet Thatcher’s ambition was to create a flourishing society far more than any 
sort of economic system and it was becoming everyday more apparent to her that any major 
recovery was doomed without substantial moral regeneration. One of her main targets in this 
process was the so called molly coddling state, which she considered had not only weakened 
individual responsibility but also perverted morals and she laid the blame for this squarely on 
the permissiveness born from socialism and the Labour Party. The remoralising process that 
Thatcher envisaged was infused with Christian principles but Grimley wonders just to what 
extent religion contributed to her success in politics. He contends that whilst mainstream 
Conservatives were wary about religion, the morality of Christian principles gave a form of 
coherence to their political strategy by enabling them to appeal to people’s sense of tradition. 
But while Thatcher continually resorted to moralised language in her rhetoric, her party did 
little to reverse permissiveness mainly because the Prime Minister’s own conception of 
morality was strongly individualised. There was, even so, one notable exception, namely 
religious education, which Thatcher believed necessary in order to raise children’s awareness 
about belief and practice. As time passed by in N°10, Thatcher’s interest in theology seemed 
to grow as a throwback to her youth or to plug gaps that her political victories had left in her 
personal landscape. But because she believed that legislation was a blunt weapon as far as the 
remoralisation of society was concerned, religious groups had a particular role to play and 
should they shirk this responsibility, then people would turn to the state, something she 
wanted to avoid at all costs. Yet Thatcher’s disappointment with the Church of England and 
Anglicanism was on many occasions palpable and often, she needed no prompting to draw 
unfavourable comparisons with other religious communities. By and large, Thatcher 
attempted to appeal to the sort of Christian morality that a majority of British people could 
relate to, however tenuously. It was this stance that ushered her into power but also fuelled 
one of the paradoxes of her mandates that of preaching morality but engendering rampant 
materialism. 
The last article in this first part looks at the coherences between Thatcherism and 
Powellism given that both were fighting different battles against different enemies but with 
the similar weapons of true conservatism. Just like other writers in this book, Camilla 
Schofield underlines the fact that Thatcher promoted the idea of Britishness in her defence of 
moral order whereas she was surrounded by supporters who readily used economics in the 
same crusade. For Powell, on the other hand, the same concept was wielded as a sign of 
allegiance to the nation and a refusal to turn his back on British sovereignty in the face of 
American dominance. The author contends that Powellism paved the way for Thatcherism in 
that it prepared the British electorate for radical politics, and his racist statements were 
designed to show that Britain was still living in her glorious international past rather than 
defending today’s nation and workers. He used race to thematise the crisis that British society 
was traversing, the permissiveness that was creeping into all walks of life and above all white 
sacrifice and white victimisation. But whereas Powell tended to politicise social deviance, 
Thatcher would readily criminalise it thus justifying her belief in the authority of the state. 
This said, Powellism is seen by many as a warning of the social dislocation of the 1970s and 
this is reflected in the broad-based support he found amongst electors disappointed with the 
political system. The author ends this section of her article by reminding readers of Powell’s 
notorious fall and government immigration policy until 1974. Although Powell no longer had 
a front seat on the political stage, he had nonetheless started the ball rolling and preached the 
“transformism” that Thatcher was going to adhere to. Yet whereas many of her colleagues 
readily believed that the economy could be used to spark off a sea change in attitudes, 
Thatcher continued to preach the need to stamp out socialism and the corporatism that it had 
engendered to get the country back on its moral feet again. The trade unions were a case in 
point given the collective force they could muster up as compared to individual salvation. 
Interestingly, Thatcher and Powell collided in their disbelief that economic policy could affect 
the morals of the nation: economics were only a method. Thus Powell spoke out against the 
Thatcherite economics that attempted to achieve this just as Thatcher herself was wary of 
Powell’s discourse on racial nationalism which she feared would have pushed the 
Conservatives too far to the right. Instead, in order to integrate the anti-immigration argument 
into her politics, Thatcher resorted to promoting the responsibility government had to protect 
the “nation”, hence her much quoted analysis of Britain being “swamped” by different 
cultures. Thatcher and Powell came together once again over the value of war during the 
Falklands’ crisis, the former declaring in typical 1940s rhetoric that this conflict underlined 
the moral responsibilities that the British had both home and abroad. For Powell, the war was 
an opportunity to lambast the permissiveness ushered in during a period when young people 
did not experience armed conflict, harking back to the rhetoric of 1945. But where the two 
disagreed was on Thatcher’s Atlanticism and to a certain extent her views on Europe because 
Powell believed that in the long run they would jeopardise British sovereignty and even 
worse, fail to protect the conservative nation. Powell had set the trend of identity politics to 
identify defenders and opponents of the British state. Fundamentally for him, values were 
transcendental and could not or should not be fought for. Yet what he misunderstood was the 
force of the free market that once unleashed under Thatcher, would prove to be a far more 
revolutionary power than any of the other social dynamics he feared. 
Part II of this book deals with the Thatcher years per se and the first contribution written by 
Laura Beers analyses the Conservative’s Party appeal to women during the 1980s given the 
progressive swing in women’s support for Labour. Beers begins with an assessment of the 
gender gap in British politics underlining the fact that different survey results showed a 
tendency for this to decline in the 1980s. These findings intrigued political scientists given 
Mrs Thatcher’s overt lack of support for feminism and the causes generally defended by 
women’s movements and prompted them to examine women’s so-called deviant electoral 
behaviour or apparent conservatism. Yet even if sex no longer seems to be a viable indicator 
of political preference, this “dealignment” has not put an end to either generational divisions 
among female voters or motivational ones between the two sexes. On many occasions, these 
latter have proven to alienate women voters from the Conservatives rather than attract them to 
the Labour Party, except for those on the same hard-line moral wavelength as the Prime 
Minister. Thatcher appealed to women by emphasising her housewife-come-mother-come 
homemaker’s approach to politics, in short by promoting the family as being the main social 
unit. According to her, it is in this sphere that women achieve their essential purpose, which 
explains her government’s reticence to promote policies that might have encouraged them to 
shirk these responsibilities. The author continues her analysis by providing detailed poll data 
about women’s reactions to Thatcher as a role model. Generally speaking, they reacted more 
positively than their male counterparts to Thatcher’s influence on politics or at least would 
publicly admit their admiration for her. Labour was intrigued by women’s liking Thatcher, 
commissioned research and found once again that her strength of character was an important 
vote catcher among women electors especially those who identified with success and 
exceptionalism rather than solely feminist driven equality seekers. The author’s argument is 
the same when it comes to Mrs Thatcher’s “housewife” and “common sense” approach to 
economics whereby countries should organise their economies along the same lines as 
households and families, spending no more than they earn. Yet, attitudes to government 
spending show slightly different approaches according to sex, especially in the fields of 
welfare, employment and above all, education. The Conservative’s knew full well that this 
was traditionally an issue that women - and especially mothers - felt more strongly about than 
men and deliberately played the education message in respect of this potential support. The 
author’s main contention is that the emphasis on Thatcher’s “law and order” appeal to women 
has obscured other important aspects of their support for her and that by breaking down poll 
data, sub trends can be established that explain to what extent the powerful housewife figure 
of Mrs Thatcher attracted so much support from women during the 1980s. 
The following contribution deals with the decline of class politics in Mrs Thatcher’s Britain 
with the authors contending that it was her own class image which prompted her to aim for a 
more positive and classless vision of politics. Added to this was the creation of a new range of 
oppositions within British society that left little room for the “class” argument all the more so 
as Thatcher herself believed in ordinary people who would adhere to the “ordinary” universal 
values she promoted rather than those dictated by nebulous class distinctions. Hence the 
creation of a new class constituency that revolved around the “middle” of the country sharing 
Thatcher’s commonsense and ordinary values, their common enemy being, if all went well, 
socialism. To highlight this transition, the authors, Jon Lawrence and Florence Sutcliffe-
Braithwaite, take a step back in time and describe the post-war historical backdrop against 
which class distinction took place. They maintain that moving the goalposts of affluence was 
not necessarily accompanied by a transfer of corresponding values, especially given that 
stereotypes - especially those conveyed by popular media, and culture - die hard. The idea of 
a class ridden society was still manifest and social science seemed to tap into this trend thus 
opening up a breech which Thatcher and her disciples could exploit adroitly. This they did by 
decontaminating the middle class and relabeling it the “aspirational” class, who shared her 
affection for ordinariness but whose members would nevertheless endeavour to improve their 
lot whatever their background or life circumstances. Once again, it was the socialist class 
construct that she abhorred preferring the rugged individualism that was to characterise her 
own vision. Housing and tax were used conspicuously in the crusade not only to encourage 
individual responsibility, but also legitimise material improvement. These efforts were 
somewhat timid in 1979 due to the belief that promising material improvement was not 
enough to secure victory and that some compromises had to be accepted. Yet the future 
electoral victories in 1983 and 1987 were to enable the Conservatives to slay the giants of 
economically and occupational definitions of class and replace them with a vision based on 
individuals and families: ultimately this was part and parcel of their strategic onslaught on the 
socialist collectivism that they felt was at the heart of all society’s evils. 
The 1984-1985 miners’ strike is one of the outstanding events during the Thatcher years 
pitting the reinforced legislative arsenal of the state against the specific cultural and industrial 
forces of the miners. David Howell recounts the evolution of trade unionism within the 
industry and the impact on union truculence of differential wage structures and government 
imposed productivity targets as from the late 1970s. A detailed account of the strike itself is 
provided and the author lays particular emphasis on the multitude of divisions and disputes 
that appeared within the movement itself at all levels, especially when the legality of strike 
movements was challenged in the courts. The overall impression the reader gleans is that 
much of the strike movement escaped the control that any national mining authority, union or 
otherwise, would have been keen to enforce. Howell concludes by dealing with the legacies of 
this episode on politics and points out the shift of support from Labour to both the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal-Social Democrats. He contends that industrial relations 
within the mining sector were damaged beyond repair during this period but suggests that the 
very culture of the mining industry was just as much to blame for this as any attempt by the 
main political actors to reap benefit from any kind of fragmentation of the union movement. 
The following contribution is devoted to the different brands of devolution promoted in 
Scotland and Wales and begins by identifying the different concepts of unionism, 
unitarianism and nationalism, all prone to misinterpretation. The author, Richard Finlay, then 
points out the importance of class identities and civic nationalism in the devolution debate. 
The first part of the chapter deals with unionism in both countries and kicks off with an 
analysis of electoral fortunes of the main parties there, underlining the fact that electoral 
systems can potentially distort results and in the case of Scotland, amplified what was widely 
perceived to be an outright rejection of Thatcherism and the Conservative Party. Thatcher 
tried to appeal to nationalist sentiment especially in Scotland but somewhat unwittingly 
tended to advocate unitarianism rather than unionism in the name of British uniformity and 
“sameness”. Yet this latter concept came across a major stumbling block namely public sector 
agencies which the thatcherites were busy dismantling but to which both the Scottish and 
Welsh were particularly attached as one of the raisons d’être for the post-war union in the first 
place. Thatcher’s main failing was indeed her inability to deal adequately with sub-British 
identities just as she failed to engage correctly with regional ones. Instead, her Party would 
merely preach the financial benefits of union for the Welsh and the Scottish thus giving the 
impression that they ignored the wider issues linked to nationalism. This left Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats to champion the cause of devolution as a response to the democratic deficit 
caused by the almighty strength of the Conservative Party in England, all the more so in 
Scotland which enjoyed greater territorial integrity. The author pursues his analysis by 
relating the major socio-economic changes that affected Great Britain during the Thatcher 
years. He contends that both countries and whole communities suffered acutely from 
deindustrialisation which was perceived as being an assault on working class culture, another 
wedge driven between areas of the “old” and the “new” economy. In Wales and Scotland, this 
is precisely what generated the most hostility towards Thatcherism and exacerbated 
nationalistic, territorial tendencies far more than any fragmentation of the political parties due 
to issues linked to the Falklands, the miners’ strike, the Poll Tax or even devolution itself. The 
author pursues his argument by broaching the question of how the notion of “civil society” 
was used in both countries. In Scotland, it was used to unite the opponents of Thatcherism and 
enabled them to foster a form of popular sovereignty but as the author is quick to point out, it 
was also a short cut used by those who had lost out from the Thatcherite revolution to return 
to the political limelight, rid their claims of the traditional class structure argument and 
portray Thatcher and her party as being quite simply alien to Scots and Scotland. In Wales, 
the same “myth” of civil society was far less exploited to conjure up a national response to 
Thatcherism especially given the loyalty to traditional class structure, the ethnic nationalism 
that Plaid Cymru tended to be associated with and the lack of territorial insularity. Richard 
Finlay concludes by stating that the same socio-economic consequences of Thatcherism 
produced different results in the two countries: in Scotland a more national response to 
Thatcherism was manufactured by accusing Britishness of being mere Englishness whereas in 
Wales, traditional structures of society came under less assault and therefore there was a 
lesser need to throw up a national barricade to reject the effects of Westminster government. 
The following author tackles the question of Ireland and starts by surveying the different 
settlement frameworks available based on the east-west, Catholic-Protestant, north-south 
axes. Marc Mulholland adroitly explains the articulation of rights, duties and claims between 
Britain and Ireland before suggesting that Britain’s constant change of tack over the course of 
the Troubles fuelled inconsistencies that were hardly propitious to uniting the feuding 
communities. He underlines the fact that Thatcher herself, on becoming Prime Minister, 
rapidly crystallised all the bitterness and hatred generated by the protracted dealings linked to 
the Irish question. A great deal of this was due to her overt contempt for the Irish nationalist 
identity while her distrust of so-called catholic alienation from state institutions during the 
rapprochement process also ruffled many feathers. This explains why many policies were 
hammered out by articulate civil servants with expert knowledge who could then rely on the 
authority of the Prime Minister for implementation. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement smacks 
of this logic but the author contends that it was Thatcher’s way of bolstering the middle 
ground against the extremes given her constant obsession with security considerations. This 
attitude contributed inevitably to the electoral success of Sinn Féin as they moved away from 
armed struggle, the extreme that Thatcher despised above all others. 
Part three of this book deals with Thatcherism and the wider world. The first author, 
Richard Vinen, looks at Thatcherism through the prism of the Cold War and devotes his first 
part to defence policy. He notes that 1979 did not usher in any major change given mainly 
that there has always been a high level of consensus in this field given the degree of highly 
specialised knowledge it requires. To this end, the commitment to the free market left defence 
largely unaffected while Thatcher’s skills in military matters were often - silently - questioned 
by those bemused by the so-called incongruity of a woman becoming involved, all the more 
so as she had never worn military uniform. In fact, the biggest changes in defence questions 
during Thatcher’s premierships were raised by the Labour Party who were openly turning 
their backs on Britain’s nuclear deterrent. The backlash on this was substantial especially after 
the Falklands War which ensured a considerable electoral victory for the Conservatives in 
1983 and also devastated Labour’s political credibility for years to come, voters believing that 
a leading member of NATO could not suffer such humiliation in the Cold War context of the 
1980s. This latter also dictated Thatcher’s view of other European countries and leaders: 
despite her distrust of Europe, she had good relations with European leaders and indeed 
countries who would stand firm on their allegiance to the western block. She was prepared to 
accommodate the Soviet Union given her belief that it could not be changed and her 
Atlanticism – especially during Reagan’s two mandates – was geared towards elaborating 
containment policies designed to thwart the spread of communism. Towards the end of her 
premiership, Thatcher saw herself increasingly as an international statesperson having played 
a crucial role in ending the Cold War characterised by the fall of the Wall. But as her role on 
the international scene became more personified, so did her reputation for eccentricity, the 
prerogative of great leaders with vast experience.  But the end of the Cold War reduced 
Britain’s thirst for greatness given that unity vis-à-vis the Soviet block was no longer 
necessary. This provides some explanation for her wariness about the construction of the 
European Union given that the threat from the east was gradually dwindling. Thatcher wanted 
Britain to be a great world power and believed that economic success was a key element in 
achieving this if only because, like other European countries, the military power of Britain 
exceeded the country’s economic power. Vinen concludes by stating that one of Mrs 
Thatcher’s strengths was the ability to combine radicalism and pragmatism in her approach to 
the Cold War the result of which was to redefine Britain’s greatness – and thus her own – 
where military power was not the only defining element. 
In the following contribution Andrew Gamble deals with the evolution of Thatcher’s 
relationships with the international community and especially with Europe and America. To 
explain why and how Thatcher managed to bequeath a Eurosceptic identity on her party, the 
author looks back at the three phases through which the Conservative Party moved namely 
pro-European, to increasing scepticism followed by a renewed interest in her links with 
America. The first part deals classically with the decline of the British Empire and her 
subsequent “natural” desire to turn towards her more immediate European partners while 
maintaining her “special” relationship with America. Thatcher was to put an end to this 
zealous attitude vis-à-vis the construction of Europe within her party. Gamble’s second part 
deals with the security community to which Britain was so eager to be part of to the extent 
that her governments would readily show subservience to the American “master”. Thatcher 
followed suit but managed to underline the need for strong American leadership by focusing 
attention on security policy given the expansionist threat posed by the Soviet Union and her 
support was characterised by the use of airbases and the siting of American missiles on British 
soil. Likewise her personal relationships with world leaders; none was so strong as the 
friendship she cherished with Reagan as stated elsewhere in this book, and despite upsets 
caused by the Falklands crisis and the US intervention in Grenada, there is no denying that 
Britain’s Atlanticism was by and large rekindled during Thatcher’s premierships. The 
collapse of communism in Europe allowed Britain and America to revel in the bond they had 
created around liberal capitalism and the knowledge that they had created a new world order 
in which their leadership in the quest of freedom would be paramount. With this in mind, it 
goes without saying that the European project would be relegated to a secondary level. Yet 
Thatcher’s attitude towards Europe was ambiguous given the zeal with which she promoted a 
free market eurozone on the one hand while shirking the collective responsibilities that the 
community set out to foster on the other. The author explains how this divided the 
Conservative Party forcing the different factions into defining their perceptions of Britain’s 
overall political economy, whether they believed more in the American model or the 
continental one. Where Thatcher stands out particularly on this issue is the link she made 
between security, defence and political economy, emphasising the advantages Britain would 
have by remaining faithful to its Atlanticism for all three. This explains her promotion, along 
with her accomplice Ronald Reagan, of the Anglo-American model of capitalism as opposed 
to any European social model of society. This was portrayed as being a strategic choice for 
the country settled in political economy terms. Gamble ends his contribution by reflecting on 
the ideological community that Thatcher was supposed to have inspired and how her 
particular brand of realpolitik meshed in with the “grand design” often associated with 
Thatcherism. Between Britain and America there was indeed the ideological potential to move 
mountains and for Thatcher, this was to be used in order to reverse British decline. Thus her 
neo-liberalism was designed to bolster economic prosperity, unleash market forces and in 
doing so, ultimately slay the Giant socialism. The finer details were perhaps ignored or only 
partially understood but the overall picture of a free economy corresponded to Thatcher’s 
instinct to what she believed was “international common sense”, based on the model of 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism. To this end, Thatcher was particularly skillful in identifying British 
interests in accordance with the way America defined her own interests, not as any sort of 
rival but an accomplice underling willing to recreate the old Anglo-American bond based on 
common traits of national character. Thus Britain had bounced back from a former position of 
wariness vis-à-vis “Americanisation” which embodied high modernity and the constant 
adapting of culture. Although many Conservatives found this latter aspect difficult to 
assimilate, Thatcher managed to make Britain’s interests in security, political economy and 
ideology converge in one direction namely the United States, and there could be no – or at 
least very little – alternative. 
The last contribution attempts to provide coherence to the “end of empire” narrative during 
the Thatcher years. Stephen Howe insists from the outset on the imbrication between imperial, 
colonial and British history and begins his analysis by delving into the background of 
Thatcher and empire. To many intents and purposes Thatcher was one of the most “a-
imperial” political leaders Britain has ever had and although she would never apologise for 
colonisation, neither would she indulge in imperialist leanings. Howe takes the reader through 
some of the main incidents that occurred during the Thatcher years that had strong links with 
the legacies of empire and points out the Prime Minister’s idiosyncratic behaviour during the 
Rhodesian crisis, the Falklands War - which for many stands out as the defining point of 
Britain’s imperial past during the Thatcher years –, the US invasion of Grenada, South Africa 
and Hong Kong. For the author, these can be considered as mere post imperial “episodes” and 
he follows these descriptions with an attempt at defining the bigger picture of internal 
decolonisation within Britain itself: the decline in Britain’s national purpose, identity and 
even economy can be linked to the decline of the Empire with the Falklands episode 
redressing this momentarily; the desire for independence expressed by Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland is the “natural” conclusion to the end of the empire while Thatcher’s attitude 
to some regions or even towns in Britain smacked of her country’s attitude towards former 
colonies. Yet Howe believes that by focussing so much attention on decolonisation, too little 
has been said about the continuities of the Empire, for despite claims of decline, Britain still 
holds a world role. To link this to the Thatcher years, Howe identifies four defining 
developments: the reintegration of the Dominions into the “end-of-empire” story, internal 
decolonisations within Europe especially amongst former imperial powers where the 
consequences of imperial memory on national identities has been potent, the Europeanisation 
of decolonisation which tends to show that European integration and Atlanticism are not 
mutually exclusive and lastly, the relationship between decolonisation and the Anglo-
American partnership. 
 
Making Thatcher’s Britain provides invaluable insight into the role the Thatcher years have 
played in twentieth century Britain. To this end, the authors’ claim to originality is genuine 
and the goal achieved. Nevertheless specialist knowledge of the period is a prerequisite to 
drawing full benefit from reading given that each author’s focus is highly specialised, 
technical and detailed. This is therefore a book for advanced students who have an interest in 
political science and the contemporary history of Great Britain and who are interested in an 
analysis of the 1980s that does not isolate the period from the rest of the century as if 
Thatcherism should be considered as being out on a limb rather than part of the whole picture. 
There is indeed a “before” and an “after” Thatcher and this set of articles provides the links 
that are necessary to understand what Britain has become since the Iron Lady’s occupancy of 
N°10 Downing Street. 
 
